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Jurisdiction, Treaties, and Due Process
ROBERTO IRAOLA†
INTRODUCTION
It is wellsettled under the KerFrisbie doctrine1 “that a
court’s power to try a defendant is ordinarily not affected by
the manner in which the defendant is brought to trial.”2
This doctrine “rest[s] on the sound basis that due process of
law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of [a]
crime after being fairly appri[s]ed of the charges against
him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional
procedural safeguards.”3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
recognized in United States v. AlvarezMachain that if the
extradition treaty4 between the United States and the
† Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of International
Affairs; J.D. 1983, Catholic University Law School. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S.
Department of Justice or the United States.
1. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 52223 (1952) (upholding the
conviction of a defendant who was brought to trial in Michigan after he was
kidnapped by Michigan officers in Chicago, Illinois); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436, 444 (1886) (holding that the power of a state court to try the defendant was
not impaired by the fact he had been forcibly abducted from Peru).
2. United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Noorzai, 545 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Under the . . . Ker
Frisbie rule, the constitutional due process requirement is limited to a
guarantee of a fair trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction was
obtained over the defendant.”).
3. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522.
4. Extradition involves “the surrender by one nation to another of an
individual accused or convicted of an offen[s]e outside of its own territory, and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and
to punish him, demands the surrender.” Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289
(1902). It requires “a demand in some form by the one country upon the other.”
Stevenson v. United States, 381 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1967). Outside of
extradition, a fugitive’s presence may be secured through other means including
abduction, informal surrender, or deportation. See Matthew W. Henning,
Comment, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions Can Lead
to International Incidents, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 347, 361 (1999)
(discussing these three alternatives).
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country from which a defendant was transferred contains
an explicit provision making the treaty the exclusive means
by which the defendant’s presence may be secured, the
doctrine will not apply.5 Additionally, there is support in
case law for the proposition that certain government
conduct used to secure the custody of a criminal defendant
may be so offensive under the Due Process Clause that a
court may, as a remedy, dismiss the charges against the
defendant.6
This Article, which is divided into three parts, analyzes
the developing case law on the two exceptions to the Ker
Frisbie doctrine. First, and by way of background, the
Article discusses the two Supreme Court cases which led to
the formulation of the doctrine. Next, the Article examines
how courts have applied the holding of AlvarezMachain
that, for extradition to be the sole method of transfer of a
criminal defendant, the treaty must expressly provide for
such. Lastly, the Article analyzes the ruling of the Second
Circuit in United States v. Toscanino, which originally
promulgated an exception to the KerFrisbie doctrine for
outrageous government conduct in the procurement of a
criminal defendant, but whose continuing validity is
suspect.7
I. FORCIBLE ABDUCTION AND JURISDICTION
In Ker v. Illinois, the defendant fled to Peru after
having been charged in Illinois with larceny and
embezzlement.8 A messenger was sent to Peru with a
5. See 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992).
6. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.
1975) (holding that the defendant failed to allege a level of “shocking
government conduct” that would amount to a violation of the defendant’s due
process); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[W]e
view due process as . . . requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the
person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the
government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the
accused’s constitutional rights.”). See generally United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 43132 (1973) (“[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction.”).
7. 500 F.2d at 275.
8. 119 U.S. 436, 43738 (1886).
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warrant requesting the defendant’s extradition under the
treaty.9 However, instead of presenting the warrant to the
proper authorities, the messenger kidnapped the defendant
and brought him to the United States where he was
convicted of larceny in Cook County, Illinois.10 Rejecting the
defendant’s contention that his forcible seizure and transfer
violated his right to due process, the Supreme Court
observed that “such forcible abduction [was not a] sufficient
reason why [a] party should not answer when brought
within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to
try him for such an offen[s]e, and presents no valid objection
to his trial in such court.”11
Sixtysix years later, in Frisbie v. Collins, the Court had
occasion to reaffirm the rule in Ker.12 In Frisbie, Michigan
police officers kidnapped the defendant in Chicago, Illinois,
and brought him back to Michigan where he was tried and
convicted of murder.13 Once again, the defendant argued
that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 Applying
the rule in Ker, the Court rejected that argument holding
“that the power of a court to try a person for [a] crime is not
impaired by the fact that he ha[s] been brought within the
court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’”15
9. Id. at 438.
10. Id. at 43839. As Justice Miller explained, the papers the messenger
carried to procure the defendant’s extradition “were never brought to light in
Peru” and the facts revealed “that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the
dominions of Peru, without any preten[s]e of authority under the treaty or from
the government of the United States.” Id. at 44243.
11. Id. at 444. Discussing the meaning of “due process of law” under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Miller noted that in the context of the case
before the Court, that guarantee was met “when the party is regularly indicted
by the proper grand jury in the State court, has a trial according to the forms
and modes prescribed for such trials, and when, in that trial and proceedings, he
is deprived of no rights to which he is lawfully entitled.” Id. at 440.
12. 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
13. Id. at 520.
14. Id. The defendant also argued that his conviction could not stand under
the Federal Kidnapping Act. Id. The Court disagreed, finding that the sanctions
under that Act did not include “barring a state from prosecuting persons
wrongfully brought to it by its officers.” Id. at 523.
15. Id. at 522. Following the teaching of Ker, Justice Black observed:
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II. TREATIES AND JURISDICTION
In Ker, which involved a treaty, the United States
government did not sponsor the abduction; the person
kidnapped was a United States citizen and Peru did not
object to his prosecution.16 Contrariwise, Frisbie did not
involve an extradition treaty and law enforcement
authorities engaged in the domestic kidnapping of the
wanted defendant.17 But what if the United States
government sponsored the abduction of a fugitive defendant
from a country with which the United States had an
extradition treaty, and that country thereafter protested?
Would the KerFrisbie doctrine bar any challenge to the
jurisdiction of the court over the defendant? The Supreme
Court squarely addressed this issue forty years after Frisbie
in United States v. AlvarezMachain.18
In AlvarezMachain, Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) agents were involved in the kidnapping from
Mexico to the United States of a doctor who was suspected
of participating in the kidnapping and murder of a DEA
agent and a pilot who worked with the agent.19 Mexico
formally protested this conduct as a violation of the
[D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted
of crime after having been fairly appri[s]ed of the charges against him
and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural
safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court
to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because
he was brought to trial against his will.
Id.
16. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443; see also Linda C. Ward, Note, Forcible Abduction
Made Fashionable: United States v. AlvarezMachain’s Extension of the Ker
Frisbie Doctrine, 47 ARK. L. REV. 477, 490 (1994) (noting that Peru did not object
to the abduction of Ker, a United States citizen).
17. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520.
18. 504 U.S. 655 (1992); see Ward, supra note 16, at 493 (“[AlvarezMachain]
was the first case to come before the [Supreme] Court which combined the
elements of a governmentsponsored abduction, a valid extradition treaty in
force, and the prompt and unequivocal protest of the offended nation.”).
19. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. at 657 & n.2 (“DEA officials had attempted to
gain [the defendant’s] presence in the United States through informal
negotiations with Mexican officials, but were unsuccessful. DEA officials then,
through a contact in Mexico, offered to pay a reward and expenses in return for
the delivery of [the defendant] to the United States.”).
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extradition treaty then in effect between both countries.20
The issue before the Court was “whether a criminal
defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with
which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a
defense to the jurisdiction of [United States] courts” in such
circumstances.21
The Court analyzed the language of the treaty and
determined that it did “not purport to specify the only way
in which one country may gain custody of a national of the
other country for purposes of prosecution.”22 The Court then
rejected the contention that, based on international
precedent and practice, the treaty should be interpreted to
imply a prohibition against prosecution when the presence
of a defendant is secured by means outside the treaty.23
Following AlvarezMachain, it is clear that “an
extradition treaty does not divest courts of jurisdiction over
a defendant who has been abducted from another country
where the terms of the extradition treaty do not prohibit
such forcible abduction.”24 But what if the transfer, in a case
involving a treaty in force, is not effected by means of an
abduction, but rather by some form of expulsion or
20. Id. at 659.
21. Id. at 657.
22. Id. at 664; see also id. at 666 (“[T]he language of the Treaty, in the context
of its history, does not support the proposition that the Treaty prohibits
abductions outside of its terms.”).
23. Id. at 66669.
24. Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 495 (4th Cir. 2002); see also United States
v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]o prevail on an extradition
treaty claim, a defendant must demonstrate, by reference to the express
language of a treaty and/or the established practice thereunder, that the United
States affirmatively agreed not to seize foreign nationals from the territory of its
treaty partner.”); United States v. MattaBallesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 762 (9th Cir.
1995) (“The treaties between the United States and Honduras . . . did not
sufficiently specify extradition as the only way in which one country may gain
custody of a foreign national for purposes of prosecution.”); ReyesVasquez v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 3:07CV1460, 2007 WL 3342759, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8,
2007) (“[E]ven presuming the Petitioner was forcibly abducted, his abduction
did not violate an express provision of the treaty between the United States and
the Dominican Republic.”); United States v. Lazore, 90 F. Supp. 2d 202, 20304
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that even if the defendant was abducted, the
extradition treaty between the United States and Canada did not contain an
express prohibition against such transfer).
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deportation, or less formally, with the cooperation or
assistance of the foreign government? Or what if the
extradition violates the requested country’s domestic law or
the provisions of the treaty? Can a defendant raise a
jurisdictional defense under those circumstances? The
developing case law reveals that, as to the former question,
under the rationale of AlvarezMachain, unless the
extradition treaty expressly prohibits the method used—i.e.,
deportation, expulsion, or informal cooperation—a
defendant has no grounds to challenge the jurisdiction of
the court over him.25 With respect to the latter, principles of
international comity, the act of state doctrine, and Supreme
Court precedent have been found to foreclose a
jurisdictional challenge on the grounds that a defendant’s
extradition violated the requested country’s domestic laws
or provisions of the treaty.26 The following cases illustrate
these points.
A. Deportation and Expulsion
In United States v. ChapaGarza, the defendant
absconded from federal custody while serving a sentence for
drug related charges and fled to Mexico.27 The United States
requested his extradition from Mexico and Mexican
authorities, upon discovering that he was an American
citizen, deported him to the United States.28 Summarily
rejecting the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled
that the defendant’s transfer had not violated the terms of
the treaty, that he had not been turned over to the United
States under the treaty, and that the initiation of
extradition proceedings against him was irrelevant.29
25. See supra Part II.AB.
26. See supra Part II.C.
27. 62 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1995).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 12021; see also Kasi, 300 F.3d at 499 (“[E]ven if we assume that
the United States had formally initiated extradition proceedings under the
Extradition Treaty as now claimed, the United States government’s act of
forcibly abducting [the defendant] in lieu of pursuing the extradition process . . .
did not deprive the state court of jurisdiction over him.”); United States v.
Herbert, 313 F. Supp. 2d 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[A]bsent . . . a specific
prohibition, even after the instigation of formal extradition, the U.S.
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In a similar vein, in United States v. Arbane, the
defendant was acquitted on drug possession charges in
Ecuador and ordered deported to Iran.30 En route to Iran,
the plane stopped in Houston, Texas, where the defendant
was arrested on an indictment charging him with
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.31 Following his conviction,
the defendant argued on appeal that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to try him because his presence in the
United States had not been procured through the
extradition treaty with Ecuador.32 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention
since the treaty did not contain a clause expressly providing
that extradition was the exclusive means to obtain a
fugitive’s presence.33
government may act to obtain custody of the defendant through other channels
without invoking or violating an extradition treaty.”).
30. 446 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). Unlike ChapaGarza, no extradition
request was submitted to the foreign authorities in the case of Arbane. See id. at
122425.
31. Id. at 1225.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also United States v. Struckman, 611 F.3d 560, 573 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that the defendant’s deportation, not extradition, from Panama
to the United States did not violate the treaty between the parties); United
States v. Gardiner, 279 F. App’x 848, 850 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
expulsion of a drug trafficker was not prohibited under the terms of the
extradition treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic);
United States v. Baker, No. 935621, 1995 WL 134498, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 29,
1995) (finding that the defendant’s expulsion from Panama did not violate
extradition treaty between the parties); United States v. Liersch, No. 04CR2521,
2006 WL 6469421, at *69 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2006) (ruling that the defendant’s
deportation from Guatemala to the United States did not violate the treaty
between the parties); United States v. Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d 359, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the delivery of the defendant to FBI agents by
South African officials, which a South African court later characterized as a
deportation, did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction because no
provision in the extradition treaty between South Africa and the United States
expressly prohibited this method of transferring custody); United States v.
Stroh, No. 396CR139AHN, 2000 WL 1833397, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000)
(finding that the defendant’s expulsion from Panama, leading to his immediate
transfer to the United States by DEA agents, did not violate the extradition
treaty between the parties); United States v. Trujillo, 871 F. Supp. 215, 21720
(D. Del. 1994) (finding that the defendant was deported from the United
Kingdom to Colombia when he was arrested during a stopover in Miami, and
since this was not an extradition, it did not violate the treaty between the
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B. Informal Cooperative Transfers
Informal cooperative methods resulting in a fugitive’s
removal from a foreign country also have been found to fall
outside the terms of extradition treaties and therefore
provide no basis for a jurisdictional challenged under
AlvarezMachain.34 For example, in United States v. Torres
Gonzalez, the defendant challenged his conviction for
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise on the grounds
that he had not been formally extradited from Venezuela to
the United States in accordance with the bilateral treaty.35
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
dismissed the defendant’s jurisdictional argument, finding
that the cooperation of the Venezuelan authorities in his
apprehension and their voluntary transfer of the defendant
to the United States was not prohibited by the treaty.36
In United States v. Mejia, Panamanian authorities
seized two defendants who were charged in the United
States with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and transferred
them to the custody of DEA agents in Panama who, in turn,
transported them to the United States.37 After being
convicted, the defendants argued on appeal that the district
court had lacked jurisdiction over their case because they
United States and the United Kingdom); cf. United States v. Berganza, No. S(4)
03 CR. 987(DAB), 2005 WL 372045, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2005) (holding that
the manner in which the defendant was removed to the United States does not
invalidate indictment); United States v. Felix, No. S8 91 Cr. 451 (SWK), 1992
WL 322015, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1992) (stating that even if the defendant’s
deportation from the Dominican Republic was improper, under the KerFrisbie
doctrine, the court has power to try him). Prior to AlvarezMachain, there was
wellestablished case law that the mere existence of an extradition treaty did
not preclude the parties from deporting a fugitive. See United States v. Cordero,
668 F.2d 32, 3738 (1st Cir. 1981) (ruling that nothing in the extradition treaties
between the United States and Panama or Venezuela prevented either of those
sovereign nations from deporting the defendant to the United States to stand
trial); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 309 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that
there was no demand for the defendant’s extradition from the United States to
Thailand authorities who delivered the defendant to DEA agents at the
Bangkok airport).
34. Informal cooperation may lead to a defendant’s deportation. See
Struckman, 611 F.3d at 572.
35. 240 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001).
36. Id.
37. 448 F.3d 436, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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were transferred to the United States in disregard of the
requirements of the extradition treaty between the two
countries.38 Applying the rationale of AlvarezMachain, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that the United
StatesPanama treaty, like the United StatesMexico treaty,
“contain[ed] no prohibition against procuring the presence
of an individual outside the terms of the treaty—let alone
one barring the signatories from informally cooperating
with each other as they did in th[at] case.”39
C. Act of State Doctrine and International Comity
In some instances, a defendant who is extradited will
argue that in granting the extradition request, the
requested country’s executive violated its own domestic law;
therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction and the case must be
dismissed. In other instances, a defendant will maintain
that the indictment should be dismissed because his
extradition violated specific provisions in the treaty. In
either case, the deference which our courts must give to the
foreign country’s extradition determination—through
application of either the act of state doctrine40 or principles
38. Id. at 442.
39. Id. at 443; see also United States v. TorresGarcia, No. 05267(RMC),
2007 WL 1207204, at *14 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2007) (ruling that provisions of
extradition treaty between the United States and Panama did not preclude
Panamanian authorities from denying the defendant admission to Panama and
turning him over to DEA officials who then took him by plane to the United
States); United States v. Bourdet, 477 F. Supp. 2d 164, 16970, 178 (D.D.C.
2007) (finding that the defendants’ arrest by Salvadorian authorities and
subsequent transfer to DEA agents who then transported them by plane to the
United States did not violate provisions of the extradition treaty between El
Salvador and the United States); United States v. Herbert, 313 F. Supp. 2d 324,
327 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the voluntary transfer of the defendant by
Belizian authorities to DEA agents who then transported him to the United
States did not violate the United StatesBelize extradition treaty).
40. The act of state doctrine “precludes the courts of this country from
inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). While “once viewed . . . as an expression of
international law, resting upon ‘the highest considerations of international
comity and expediency,’” more recently, the Supreme Court has described the
doctrine as one guided by our “domestic separation of powers, reflecting ‘the
strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing
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of international comity41—generally leads to the rejection of
such contentions.42 The following cases illustrate this point.
1. Alleged Violation of Domestic Law by Requested
Country. In ReyesVasquez v. U.S. Attorney General, after
pleading guilty to racketeering and conspiracy to commit
murder, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that he was extradited to the United States
from the Dominican Republic in violation of the Dominican
Republic’s domestic law which precluded the surrender of
its own citizens.43 The district court denied the petition on
the basis of the act of state doctrine,44 and this ruling was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.45 The circuit court reasoned that the
presidential decree granting the defendant’s extradition was
“an ‘official act of a foreign sovereign’” under the act of state
doctrine and therefore it was “appropriate for United States

on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder’ the conduct of foreign affairs.”
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990)
(citations omitted).
41. International comity has been described as “the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). International
comity is manifested in two ways. First, under prescriptive comity, courts will
“construe[] ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the
sovereign authority of other nations.” F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). Additionally, there is “comity of courts, whereby
judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged
elsewhere.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
42. Courts tend to apply the act of state doctrine to challenges involving the
alleged misapplication by a foreign government of its own domestic law when
granting an extradition request. Principles of international comity come into
play when the question involves the alleged misapplication by a foreign
government of the terms of the extradition treaty.
43. No. 3:07CV1460, 2007 WL 3342759, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2007).
44. See id. at *23.
45. ReyesVasquez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 304 F. App’x 33, 36 (3d Cir. 2008).
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federal courts to abstain from declaring it invalid under
Dominican Republic domestic law.”46
A similar result was reached in United States v.
Knowles, where following his convictions for drugrelated
offenses, the defendant appealed to the Eleventh Circuit,
arguing in part that the district court had erred in denying
his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of personal
jurisdiction.47 Specifically, the defendant maintained that
his extradition from the Bahamas to the United States had
violated both Bahamian law and an order from the
Bahamian Supreme Court.48 Applying the act of state
doctrine, the circuit court rejected the defendant’s argument
that the district court had erred in not dismissing the
indictment.49 The circuit court reasoned that a
determination that the Bahamian authorities had violated
their own laws when they elected to authorize the
defendant’s extradition would, in contravention of the act of
state doctrine, require a United States court “‘to declare
invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed
within its own territory.’”50
2. Alleged Violation of Treaty Terms by Requested
Country. Johnson v. Browne51 is the seminal case on the
question of whether United States courts have the authority
to review the decision of a foreign country granting a United
States extradition request on the grounds that the offense
for which the fugitive was sought and surrendered was in
fact not extraditable under the treaty. There, the Supreme
Court held that “[w]hether the crime came within the
provision of the treaty was a matter for the decision of the
46. Id. (“[W]hether [the] President [of the Dominican Republic] may lawfully
authorize [the defendant’s] extradition despite a prohibition under Dominican
Republic law is a question for the courts of the Dominican Republic.”).
47. 390 F. App’x 915, 928 (11th Cir. 2010).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S.
400, 405 (1990)); see also United States v. Merit, 962 F.2d 917, 921 (9th Cir.
1992) (“Even if the Republic did disregard its own laws in failing to issue a
warrant of extradition, this court cannot question the validity of South Africa’s
domestic actions.”).
51. 205 U.S. 309 (1907).
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[Canadian] authorities, and such decision was final by the
express terms of the treaty itself.”52 While the treaty in
Johnson contained a provision granting finality to the
requested state’s surrender decision, Johnson “has been
interpreted to stand for the broader proposition that a
foreign government’s decision to extradite an individual in
response to a request from the United States is not subject
to review by United States courts.”53 As the court aptly
observed in United States v. Campbell, if “cordial
international relations” is the goal, “[i]t could hardly
promote harmony to request a grant of extradition and
then, after extradition is granted, have the requesting
nation take the stance that the extraditing nation was
wrong to grant the request.”54
This rationale will also bar a challenge based not on
whether the offense in question is an extraditable crime
within the treaty, but rather whether the extradition for the
offense sought is foreclosed by the application of another
provision in the treaty, such as a non bis in idem clause.55
52. Id. at 316.
53. United States v. Medina, 985 F. Supp. 397, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also
United States v. Campbell, 300 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e interpret
Johnson v. Browne to mean that our courts cannot secondguess another
country’s grant of extradition to the United States.”); Casey v. Dep’t of State,
980 F.2d 1472, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A]t a minimum, Johnson means that an
American court must give great deference to the determination of the foreign
court in an extradition proceeding.”); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827
F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Johnson . . . makes a broad[] statement
regarding the proper deference to be accorded a surrendering country’s decision
on extraditability.”); McGann v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 488 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir.
1973) (“The holding of Johnson v. Browne precludes any review of the Jamaican
court’s decision as to the extraditable nature of the offense.”) (internal citation
omitted).
54. 300 F.3d at 209.
55. The Latin phrase non bis in idem means “[n]ot twice for the same thing”
and usually refers to the legal bar against double jeopardy. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1150 (9th ed. 2009). The double jeopardy protections of the Fifth
Amendment do not foreclose a successive prosecution for the same offense by a
different sovereign; therefore, they do not serve as a bar to extradition. See In re
Extradition of Coleman, 473 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (N.D.W. Va. 2007). The treaty
under which a defendant’s extradition is sought, however, is likely to contain a
double jeopardy provision—commonly known as a non bis in idem clause—that
may be more restrictive than the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v.
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For example, in United States v. Salinas Doria, the United
States requested the defendant’s extradition from Mexico on
drugrelated charges.56 After he was surrendered, the
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
his extradition had violated the non bis in idem provision in
the extradition treaty.57 Relying on Johnson and its progeny,
the district court denied the defendant’s motion.58 In doing
so, the district court noted that the Mexican government not
only was “fully capable” of making an informed decision
regarding whether the offenses for which the United States
sought the defendant’s extradition constituted the same
offenses for which he had been convicted in Mexico, it had
also considered the defendant’s argument under the non bis
in idem provision of the treaty and rejected it.59
In United States v. Anderson, following convictions for
conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to
defraud the United States, and other related offenses, the
defendant argued on appeal that his convictions should be
vacated because he had been extradited to the United
States while his appeal of the annulment of his Costa Rican
citizenship was still pending before the Costa Rican courts.60
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected the defendant’s contention that his extradition
violated the governing treaty between the United States
and Costa Rica.61 The court observed that the treaty did not
Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d
167, 177 (2d Cir. 1980).
56. No. 01 Cr. 21(GEL), 2008 WL 4684229, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008).
57. Id. at *2.
58. Id. at *23.
59. Id. at *3. Whether a defendant who has been extradited has standing to
raise a violation of the treaty’s terms absent a protest by the foreign country is
debatable. Compare MattaBallesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.
1990) (“It is well established that individuals have no standing to challenge
violations of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the sovereigns
involved.”), with United States v. Herbert, 313 F. Supp. 2d 324, 33031
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Courts have . . . found that in limited circumstances a
defendant may have standing to raise violations of an extradition treaty. Those
exceptions arise where the extradition has violated the rule of speciality or
where the United States government participated in shocking and outrageous
conduct in securing the presence of the defendant.”).
60. 472 F.3d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2006).
61. Id. at 66667.
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prohibit a grant of extradition if an appeal regarding a
fugitive’s citizenship status was pending.62 The court further
noted that the defendant was granted citizenship by Costa
Rican authorities contrary to the provisions of the treaty
since the defendant’s naturalization proceedings should
have been suspended after the United States formally
requested his extradition.63 Costa Rican authorities
recognized this error when they subsequently annulled the
defendant’s grant of citizenship and suspended any further
naturalization proceedings, ultimately leading to the
defendant’s appeal.64 In Anderson, the court found no breach
of the treaty.65 If it had, Johnson and the application of
principles of international comity presumably would have
led the circuit court to conclude that Costa Rica’s decision to
grant the extradition request was not subject to review by
United States courts.
III. OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT AND JURISDICTION
In United States v. Toscanino, the defendant was
convicted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York of conspiracy to import
narcotics into the United States and sentenced to twenty
years in prison.66 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
court unlawfully acquired jurisdiction over him because he
was kidnapped by American agents in Uruguay, taken to
Brazil where he was tortured, and then brought to the
United States to stand trial.67
The defendant alleged that he and his wife, who was
seven months pregnant at the time, were lured by
Uruguayan policemen (at least one of whom was a paid
agent of the United States) to a deserted bowling alley in
Montevideo, Uruguay, where he was knocked unconscious
with a gun, bound, blindfolded, and thrown into the rear
seat of a police car.68 From there he was taken to Brazil
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 667.
65. Id.
66. 500 F.2d 267, 26869 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. Id. at 269.
68. Id.
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where, during a seventeen day period, he was interrogated
and tortured.69 The defendant asserted that his Brazilian
captors denied him food and sleep for days at a time and fed
him intravenously to keep him alive.70 When he was not
responsive to questioning, the defendant maintained that
his captors pinched his fingers with metal pliers and
flushed alcohol into his nose and eyes and other fluids into
his anal passage.71 In addition, his captors attached
electrodes to his toes, earlobes, and genitals, sending
electricity throughout his body “rendering him unconscious
for indeterminate periods of time.”72 After this seventeen
day ordeal, the defendant claimed that he was drugged by
BrazilianAmerican agents and placed on a flight destined
for the United States where he was then arrested and
brought before the court to answer for the drug charge
pending against him.73
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit determined that, in light of the evolving standards
since the promulgation of the KerFrisbie doctrine, due
process “requir[ed] a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over
the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the
result of the government’s deliberate, unnecessary and
unreasonable invasion of the accused’s constitutional
rights.”74 The Second Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings, including an
evidentiary hearing if the defendant offered credible
“evidence that the action was taken by or at the direction of
United States officials.”75 Because the defendant failed to
present credible evidence of participation by United States
officials in his abduction or torture, the district court
subsequently declined to hold a hearing and denied the
motion to dismiss.76

69. Id. at 270.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 275.
75. Id. at 281.
76. See United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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That same year, in United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler, the Second Circuit clarified the holding in
Toscanino.77 Under the direction of United States agents,
the defendant in Gengler, a licensed pilot, was lured to
travel from Argentina to Bolivia.78 There, he was taken into
custody by Bolivian officials and placed on a plane bound for
the United States where he was then arrested upon landing
in New York.79
In rejecting the defendant’s challenge to the manner in
which the district court acquired jurisdiction over him, the
Second Circuit first observed that it had not “intend[ed] to
suggest [in Toscanino] that any irregularity in the
circumstances of a defendant’s arrival in the jurisdiction
would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court.”80 The
court went on to rule that since the process involving the
defendant’s transfer to the United States did not involve
“torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct,” he could
not avail himself of the exception to the KerFrisbie rule
recognized in Toscanino.81
While the First82 and Ninth83 Circuits have recognized
the Toscanino exception, the Seventh Circuit has rejected
77. 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1975).
78. Id. at 63.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 65.
81. Id. The court observed in Gengler:
Lacking from [the defendant’s] petition is any allegation of that
complex of shocking governmental conduct sufficient to convert an
abduction which is simply illegal into one which sinks to a violation of
due process. Unlike Toscanino, [the defendant] does not allege that a
gun blow knocked him unconscious when he was first taken into
captivity, nor does he claim that drugs were administered to subdue
him for the flight to the United States. Neither is there any assertion
that the United States Attorney was aware of his abduction, or of any
interrogation. Indeed, [the defendant] disclaims any acts of torture,
terror, or custodial interrogation of any kind.
Id. at 66; see also United States v. Noorzai, 545 F. Supp. 2d 346, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“Subsequent decisions . . . have made it clear that . . . an exception to the
KerFrisbie rule is essentially limited to the extreme facts of Toscanino, or cases
which demonstrate an analogous invasion of a defendant’s bodily integrity and
indicate government conduct of a most shocking and outrageous character.”).
82. See United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 3637 (1st Cir. 1981).
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such an exception.84 The Third,85 Fourth,86 Fifth,87 Sixth,88
Eighth,89 Eleventh,90 and District of Columbia Circuits91
have left the door open—in varying degrees.92 In the thirty
83. See United States v. Struckman, 611 F.3d 560, 57374 (9th Cir. 2010). As
the court recognized in Struckman, there is “tension” in the Ninth Circuit’s case
law as to the continuing vitality of the outrageous conduct defense as a basis for
dismissal. Id. at 573 n.8. For example, in United States v. MattaBallesteros, a
panel held that Supreme Court cases after Toscanino undermined its holding
and that a “court should only consider dismissing [an] indictment based upon its
supervisory powers.” 71 F.3d 754, 763 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995). Over a decade later,
in United States v. Anderson, a different panel considered an outrageous
conduct defense as a basis for dismissal of an indictment, citing Matta
Ballesteros. 472 F.3d 662, 66667 (9th Cir. 2006).
Struckman evaluated a defendant’s challenge to jurisdiction under both
outrageous conduct grounds (which would violate due process) and a court’s
supervisory powers. Struckman, 611 F.3d at 57375. As to the latter, the panel
observed that an indictment would be subject to dismissal “(1) to implement a
remedy for the violation of a recognized statutory or constitutional right; (2) to
preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate
considerations validly before a jury; and (3) to deter future illegal conduct.” Id.
at 574 (quoting MattaBallesteros, 71 F.3d at 763).
84. MattaBallesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 263 (7th Cir. 1990).
85. See United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 31213 (3d Cir. 2002).
86. See United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1983).
87. See United States v. ChapaGarza, 62 F.3d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 1984); see also United
States v. Fernandez, 500 F. Supp. 2d 661, 665 (W.D. Tex. 2006); United States
v. Fraguela, No. CRIM.A. 96339, 1998 WL 351851, at *1 (E.D. La. June 26,
1998).
88. See United States v. Pelaez, 930 F.2d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 1991).
89. See Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 1981).
90. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567, 568 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984). In United States v. Noriega, the
Eleventh Circuit considered jurisdictional challenges based on allegedly
unconscionable government conduct on both due process and supervisory power
grounds. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1214.
91. See United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United
States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Tenth Circuit has yet
to address the application of the Toscanino exception.
92. Compare United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that there is reason to
doubt the soundness of the Toscanino exception, even as limited to its flagrant
facts.”), with Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1214 (“[The defendant] has not alleged that
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seven years since the promulgation of the Toscanino
exception, however, no court “has ever found conduct that
rises to the level necessary to require the United States to
divest itself of jurisdiction.”93 In general, when rejecting a
defense challenge under the Toscanino exception, courts
have concluded either that the alleged conduct was not
sufficiently outrageous as to warrant dismissal,94 that it
involved only a lure,95 or that United States officials were
the government mistreated him personally, and thus, he cannot come within the
purview of the caveat to KerFrisbie recognized . . . [in Toscanino] . . . were this
court inclined to adopt such an exception.”).
93. MattaBallesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cir. 1990). It bears
noting that on remand, the district court in Toscanino denied the motion to
dismiss because the defendant failed to produce credible evidence that United
States agents had participated in his torture and abduction. United States v.
Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Struckman, 611 F.3d 560, 57374 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding a regional security officer’s misstatements to Panamanian
authorities, after authorities had decided to cooperate with United States
officials leading to the defendant’s expulsion, not so shocking and outrageous to
justify dismissal of indictment); United States v. MattaBallesteros, 71 F.3d 754,
76164 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that even if after the defendant’s forcible
abduction he was beaten and burned with a stun gun while being transported to
the United States, such alleged treatment would be insufficient to justify
dismissal of indictment under the court’s supervisory powers); Darby, 744 F.2d
at 153031 (holding that the defendant’s claim of being abducted at gunpoint
and forced on a plane bound for the United States did not rise to the level of
outrageous conduct in Toscanino); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st
Cir. 1981) (ruling that poor treatment of the defendants by Panamanian
authorities, which included insults, slaps, and poor jail conditions before they
were sent to the United States was “a far cry from deliberate torture”); United
States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 90102 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that enticement of
the defendant onto a plane and subsequent use of a gun and threatening
language during transport to the United States did not constitute gross
mistreatment); United States v. Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that delivery of the defendant to FBI agents by South
African officials did not involve shocking or outrageous government conduct);
United States v. Stroh, No. 396 CR 139 AHN, 2000 WL 1833397, at *56 (D.
Conn. Nov. 3, 2000) (finding that the defendant’s expulsion from Panama did
not involve inhuman, cruel, or outrageous treatment).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[The
defendant] was duped by agents of the government who persuaded him to travel
to the Dominican Republic. With the cooperation of the authorities there [he]
was placed on a commercial aircraft bound for the United States.”); United
States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that the defendant
was lured to board a plane for the Dominican Republic where he was then
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not involved in the conduct.96 It is also noteworthy that
while the Supreme Court in AlvarezMachain did not
address the Toscanino exception because the ruling
appealed from below was not premised on the Due Process
Clause,97 the Court affirmed the continuing validity of the
KerFrisbie doctrine even though the forcible abduction of
the defendant may have been “shocking” and “in violation of
general international law principles.”98
detained and deported to the United States); United States v. Noorzai, 545 F.
Supp. 2d 346, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Defendant’s allegations of deceit and
government misconduct, which do not implicate physical abuse of any kind, are
insufficient to provide any basis for refusal to entertain this prosecution on due
process grounds.”); United States v. TorresGarcia, No. 05267(RMC), 2007 WL
1207204, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2007) (finding that the defendant was lured to
Panama where he was denied admission, and from which he was then
transferred by DEA officials to the United States); United States v. Fernandez,
500 F. Supp. 2d 661, 66566 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that at worst, the
defendant “was the victim of a nonviolent trick” in presenting herself to law
enforcement authorities on the United StatesMexico border); United States v.
Fraguela, No. CRIM.A. 96339, 1998 WL 351851, at *1 (E.D. La. June 26, 1998)
(alleging that undercover DEA agents lured the defendant to the Dominican
Republic where he was denied entry, causing him to travel to Puerto Rico where
he was then arrested).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Pelaez, 930 F.2d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[The
defendant] acknowledges that United States officials had no involvement in his
seizure and removal from Colombia.”); United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283,
28485 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that the defendant failed to allege United States
agents played any role in torture or interrogation of the defendant in the
Dominican Republic); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495, 495 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding that even if the Toscanino exception was viable, no United States
agents played a role in the torture allegedly administered by Panamanian
authorities); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding no
proof that Chilean police were acting as agents of the United States when they
arrested and allegedly mistreated the defendant prior to transferring him to the
United States by plane).
97. See Brief for Petitioner at *1213, United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504
U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 91712), 1992 WL 551127.
98. United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992). Shortly after
the Second Circuit’s decision in Toscanino, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the continuing application of the Ker
Frisbie doctrine by declining to “retreat from the established rule that illegal
arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
119. Thereafter, in INS v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Court
reiterated that “[t]he ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a
criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful
arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation
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CONCLUSION
Under the KerFrisbie doctrine, “the manner by which a
defendant is brought to trial does not affect the
government’s ability to try him.”99 Following Alvarez
Machain, it is clear that “an extradition treaty does not
divest courts of jurisdiction over a defendant who has been
abducted from another country where the terms of the
extradition treaty do not prohibit such forcible abduction.”100
Furthermore, the developing case law reveals that under
the holding of AlvarezMachain, unless the extradition
treaty expressly prohibits it, a defendant has no grounds to
challenge the jurisdiction of the court over him if his
transfer came about by means of deportation or expulsion,101
occurred.” LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039. More recently, as noted in the text
above, in AlvarezMachain, the Court again affirmed the rule of KerFrisbie
even though the forcible abduction could be deemed shocking and in violation of
general principles of international law. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. at 66970.
These decisions from the Supreme Court have caused some lower courts, even in
the Second Circuit, to question the continuing viability of the Toscanino
exception. See, e.g., United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 31213 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“the exception described in Toscanino rests on shaky ground”); Matta
Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 263 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to adopt the
exclusionary rule in Toscanino as it “no longer retains vitality”); United States
v. Umeh, No. 09 Cr. 524(JSR), 2001 WL 9397, at *34, (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011)
(“[W]hile the Second Circuit has never explicitly overruled Toscaninio, the fact
that both of the pillars on which it rests have been removed suggests that all
that remains is a rhetorical facade wholly lacking in legal foundation.”); United
States v. Ghailani, No. S10 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK), 2010 WL 1839030, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010) (“it is doubtful that Toscanino remains authoritative”);
see also United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. TorresGarcia, No. 05267(RMC), 2007 WL 1207204, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr.
24, 2007).
99. United States v. MattaBallesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 762 (9th Cir. 1995).
100. Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 495 (4th Cir. 2002); see also United States
v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 1997); MattaBallesteros, 71 F.3d at
762; ReyesVasquez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 3:07CV1460, 2007 WL 3342759, at
*4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2007); United States v. Lazore, 90 F. Supp. 2d 202, 20304
(N.D.N.Y. 2000).
101. See United States v. Struckman, 611 F.3d 560, 57173 (9th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Gardiner, 279 F. App’x 848, 850 (11th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. ChapaGarza,
62 F.3d 118, 12021 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Liersch, No. 04CR2521,
2006 WL 6469421, at *69 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2006); United States v. Bin Laden,
156 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Stroh, No.
396CR139AHN, 2000 WL 1833397, at *56 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000); United
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or informal cooperation102—even if the United States had
formally requested his extradition.103 Principles of
international comity104 and the act of state doctrine105
generally will foreclose a jurisdictional challenge by a
defendant on the grounds that his or her extradition
violated the requested country’s domestic laws106 or
provisions of the treaty.107
Lastly, while the First108 and Ninth109 Circuits have
recognized the Toscanino exception, the Seventh Circuit has
rejected it.110 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits111 have left the
door open—some more than others.112 To date, however, no
court “has ever found conduct that rises to the level
necessary to require the United States to divest itself of
jurisdiction.”113 It is also worth noting that although the
Supreme Court in AlvarezMachain did not address the
States v. Felix, No. S8 91 Cr. 451 (SWK), 1992 WL 322015, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
28, 1992).
102. See United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United
States v. Torres Gonzalez, 240 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v.
TorresGarcia, No. 05267(RMC), 2007 WL 1207204, at *14 (D.D.C. Apr. 24,
2007); United States v. Bourdet, 477 F. Supp. 2d 164, 16970, 17778 (D.D.C.
2007); United States v. Herbert, 313 F. Supp. 2d 324, 32627 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
103. See, e.g., Gardiner, 279 F. App’x at 850; Kasi, 300 F.3d at 499; Chapa
Garza, 62 F.3d at 120; Herbert, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
104. See supra note 41.
105. See supra note 40.
106. See United States v. Knowles, 390 F. App’x 915, 928 (11th Cir. 2010);
ReyesVasquez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 304 F. App’x 33, 36 (3d Cir. 2008); United
States v. Merit, 962 F.2d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 1992).
107. See United States v. Salinas Doria, No. 01 Cr. 21(GEL), 2008 WL
4684229, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008); see also United States v. Anderson,
472 F.3d 662, 66667 (9th Cir. 2006).
108. See supra note 82.
109. See supra note 83 (discussing the tension in the Ninth Circuit’s case law
as to the continuing vitality of the outrageous conduct defense as a basis for
dismissal); see also Anderson, 472 F.3d at 666; United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d
308, 30910 (9th Cir. 1980).
110. See supra note 84.
111. See supra notes 8591.
112. See supra note 92.
113. MattaBallesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Toscanino exception, the Court affirmed the continuing
validity of the KerFrisbie doctrine, while recognizing that
the forcible abduction of the defendant may have been
“shocking” and “in violation of general international law
principles.”114

114. United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992).

